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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLEVE C. CHILD, EARL L. BOWEN, 
ENOCH LUDLOW and J. LEE BUTLER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF SPANISH FORK, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T S 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein 
plaintiffs seeks a determination of whether or not the 
condition on annexation being imposed by the City of 
Spanish Fork is (1) constitutional, (2) an ultra vires 
act, (3) reasonable- The imposed condition is as follows: 
petitioners for annexation must transfer, without com-
pensation, at least 2 acre feet of Strawberry Valley water 
shares to the city for each acre of land to be annexed. 
Petitioners must furnish said shares, or the money equiv-
alent thereof, not only for their own property but also 
Case No. 
13960 
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for the property of minority owners who are within the 
annexation area but who do not favor the annexation. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The District Court, sitting without a jury, treated 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
12 (b) of the Uath Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court 
ruled that there was no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that therefore defendant was entitled to judg-
ment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court. More particularly they seek a determination 
of whether or not the condition on annexation being im-
posed by Spanish Fork City; (1) is unreasonable, (2) is 
an ultra vires act, (3) violates the rights of plaintiffs as 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On or about June 4,1971, and June 15,1972, plain-
tiffs, pursuant to 10-3-1 U.C.A. (1953), petitioned the 
City of Spanish Fork to annex certain territory known 
as "Wolf Hollow". On February 15, 1973, defendant 
city, by resolution determined that plaintiffs' petition 
was sufficient under 10-3-1 U.C.A. (1953) and voted 
in favor of said annexation. (R-51a). On May 2, 1973, 
the city council unanimously passed Ordinance No. W-9 
declaring the annexation of such territory and the ex-
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3 
tension of the limits of Spanish Fork City. (R-52a)-
More than 8 months later, on January 17, 1974, the city 
passed another resolution wherein they placed as a fur-
ther condition on annexation the requirement that pro-
ponents for annexation must furnish to the city certain 
specific water shares, or such shares' value equivalent in 
money. (R-54). Of the property owners in the Wolf 
Hollow Territory, not all have joined in the petition 
for annexation. Therefore, such minority property own-
ers need not in any event surrender or furnish to the 
city any water shares. Consequently, in order to accom-
plish annexation, plaintiffs herein must purchase or 
otherwise acquire water shares to cover the water share 
or money deficiency created as a result of the dissenting 
property owners' right to ignore said condition. (R-24 
and 54). 
Prior to February 15, 1973, (the date of the city's 
acceptance of plaintiffs' petition for annexation) this 
condition on annexation had never before been imposed, 
nor was said condition imposed on that date. (R-16). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I . 
T H E I M P O S I T I O N O F T H E R E Q U I R E -
M E N T T H A T P L A I N T I F F S G I V E W A T E R 
S H A R E S TO T H E C I T Y W I T H O U T COM-
P E N S A T I O N AS A CONDITION TO GRANT-
I N G A N N E X A T I O N I S AN U L T R A V I R E S 
ACT I N T H A T I T GOES B E Y O N D T H E 
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CITY'S D E L I G A T E D P O W E R TO A C Q U I R E 
W A T E R SOURCES AS S E T F O R T H BY 10-7-
4 U.C.A. (1953). 
In this matter before the Court, there are two gen-
eral questions that must be first considered. 
1. The method by which a municipality 
may extend its corporate limits. 
2- The means by which a municipality 
may acquire water sources. 
Plaintiffs argue that each question is separate and dis-
tinct and the answer to each is founded in different stat-
utory authority. The means by which a city may extend 
its corporate limits is set forth in 10-3-1 U.C.A. (1953) 
and the means by which a city may acquire water sources 
is found in 10-7-4 U.C.A. 
The pertinent portions of 10-7-4 U.C.A. (1953) 
read as follows: "The . . . city counci l . . . of any city or 
town may acquire, purchase or lease all or any part of 
any water, water works system, water supply or prop-
erty connected therewith, and whenever the governing 
body of a city or town shall deem it necessary for the 
public good, such city or town may bring condemnation 
proceedings to acquire the same • . . In all condemna-
tion proceedings, the value of land affected by the tak-
ing must be considered in connection with the water or 
water rights taken for the purpose of supplying the 
city or town or the inhabitants thereof with water." I t 
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is this statute that cities must comply with in any en-
deavor to acquire new water sources. 
Cities exist only by virtue of statutory creation and 
in their actions they are restricted to the exercise of those 
powers that state statutes have expressly conferred upon 
them. Therefore, if Spanish Fork City needs additional 
water sources for the inhabitants of the territory seek-
ing to be annexed, it must go to the statute which enables 
it to obtain such water; i.e. the city must get such author-
ity from 10-7-4 U.C.A. (1953). If the city attempts to 
acquire water sources in a manner other than that set 
forth by that statute, it is an ultra vires act. 
In Bitholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 U.2d 385, 284 
P.2d 702 (1955) at 703, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"In relation to the ultra vires question, it 
should be noted that in this state, cities are 
creatures of statute and limited in powers to 
those deligated by the legislature which we have 
characterized as: first, those granted in express 
words; second, those necessarily or fairly im-
plied or incident to the powers expressly grant-
ed; third, those essential to the accomplish-
ment of the declared objects and purposes of 
the corporation . . . " * * * "This court has gen-
erally adhered to a policy of rather strictly 
limiting the extensionof the powers of a city 
by implication." 
See also Lark v- Whitehead, 28 U.2d 343, 502 P.2d 557 
(1972). In Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322, 
481 P.2d 401 (1972) at 402, the New Mexico Court, 
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in addressing itself to a situation wherein the City of 
Santa Fe was attempting to enforce a provision requir-
ing subdividors to pay the sum of $50*00 per lot for a 
"Public Utilities Purchase Fund", found, among other 
things, that since the statute ". . . does not specifically 
confer . . . " such a right, the city was acting beyond its 
authority. 
Plaintiffs submit that such holdings on the ultra 
vires issue place a requirement on Spanish Fork City to 
follow, in this matter, the means of acquiring water 
sources as expressly set forth by 10-7-4 U.C.A. (1953), 
and that unless the city uses the means of purchase, 
lease or condemnation to obtain more water supplies, 
it would be an ultra vires act. 
The lower court in its ruling suggests that failure 
of the city to require the forfeiture of the water from 
plaintiffs would "• . . force a dilution of municipal serv-
ices, and increase the tax burden to the citizens of the 
municipality . . . " (R-l l , 12). Plaintiffs respectfully 
submit that the lower court is mistaken in that assump-
tion. First, there is no question here of whether the peti-
tioners should transfer to the city any and all water 
shares that petitioners have. Instead, the question is, 
should petitioners be compensated for those shares? 
Notwithstanding the lower court's contention, the 
requirements of 10-7-4 U.C.A. (1953) place no finan-
cial burden upon the city in situations such as this. 10-
7-7 U.C.A. (1953) through 10-7-9 U.C.A. (1953) gives 
the municipality the power to issue Bonds and leavy tax 
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assessments to initially finance the acquisition of any 
such water sources. 10-7-10 U.C.A. (1953) gives a mu-
nicipality the power to require the residents who use 
the water to pay the city for such use. By authority of 
that same statute, water connection fees and/or hookup 
charges can be assessed to water users and property 
owners in order to offset any and all expenses that the 
city may have incurred in originally obtaining such 
water. The state statutes have thus provided for the city 
adequate and proper means to acquire and finance water 
sources, and it is necessary that the city act within those 
means. Clearly, the city must follow separately the man-
dates of the enabling statutes for acquisition of new 
territory, for obtaining water for such territory, and 
for being compensated for such water acquisition. 
To require the petitioners for annexation to give 
free and clear to the city a water sources, to allow the 
city to impose other taxes relative to financing such 
water, and finally, to allow the city to charge for the use 
of such water, would clearly create a situation that 
would not only by ultra vires, but would also unjustly 
enrich the city. 
Plaintiffs further argue that the city of Spanish 
Fork cannot get around the mandate of 10-7-4 U.C.A. 
(1953) by an allusion to some kind of contract or other 
bargain between the parties whereby it appears that it 
is being proposed that the city will annex in exchange 
for the forfeiture of specific water shares or money by 
plaintiffs. Not only can a municipality not enter into a 
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contract which is beyond the scope of its power, see 
King v. Alaska State Housing Authority, Alaska 512 
P.2d 887 (1973) at 891. "A municipality cannot use 
its police power for bargaining purposes . . ." Sheridan 
v. Valley Sanitation District, 137 Colo. 315, 324 P.2d 
1038. In State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. City of She-
boygan, III, Wis. 23, 86 N.W. 657, 662, that court said: 
"To permit the city to base its action upon con-
siderations of financial benefit to itself would 
be allowing it to put its powers up for sale to 
the highest bidder." * * * "We say without 
hesitation that the city has no right to barter 
with the police powers, or exact for itself finan-
cial benefits as a condition for its exercise. 
Such power must be exercised for the public 
good and public welfare, and not for public 
gain." 
See also: Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 223 
Wis. 251, 270 N.W. 336. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that to allow 
the city to impose its condition on annexation in order 
to acquire free additional water sources would go well 
beyond the city's authority to act and would completely 
abrogate the express provisions of 10-7-4 U.C-A. 
(1953). That city is without authority to act contrary 
to said enabling statute is clearly stated by the Utah 
Court in the following quotation. 
"A general power granted to the corpora-
tion to pass all ordinances necessary for the 
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welfare of the corporation, is qualiifed and re-
stricted by those other clauses and provisions 
of the charter or the general law which specify 
particular purposes for which ordinances may 
be passed. Otherwise, the general clause would 
confer authority to abrogate the limitations im-
plied from the express provisions." Lark v. 
Whitehead, supra. 
POINT I I . 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS 
FINDING THAT THE CITY'S REQUIRE-
MENT THAT PLAINTIFF 'S GIVE WATER 
SHARES TO T H E CITY IS NOT A TAKING 
OF PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT COM-
PENSATION. 
The city of Spanish Fork cannot compel the plain-
tiffs to surrender their constitutionally protected right 
that private property cannot be taken for a public pur-
pose without just compensation as a pre-condition to the 
city's exercising its discretionary power to annex. 
10-3-1 U.C.A. (1953) very simply sets forth the 
method by which a municipality may extend its cor-
porate limits. Basically this entails the filing of the ap-
propriate petition for annexation and the approval of 
the city council. 10-3-1 U.C.A- (1953), however, has no 
provisions for contracting or otherwise bargaining for 
the privilege of annexation. The city asserts, and 
plaintiffs agree, however, that it is within the city's per-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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rogative to proscribe certain reasonable conditions in 
connection with annexation (R-4). 
In Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 17 U.2d 135, 493 P.2d 
641 (1972) at 643, the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
"The determination of the boundaries of a city 
and what may or may not be encompassed 
therein, including annexation or severance, is a 
legislative function to be performed by the gov-
erning body of the city. The courts are and 
should be reluctant to intrude into the perroga-
tive of the legislative branch of government, 
and will interfere with such action only if it 
plainly appears that it is so lacking in pro-
priety and reason that it must be denied ca-
pricious and arbitrary, or is in excess of the 
authority of the legislative body/' (emphasis 
added) 
The case clearly places a limitation on the kind of 
conditions the city can impose. 
The concept that cities have great latitude in carry-
ing out their various discretionary power is not unique 
to, nor confined to matters of annexation, and the Utah 
Court has expressed its concern over court's intervening 
in matters that are generally considered legislative per-
rogatives. However, in Gibbons and Reed v. North Salt 
Lake City, 19 U.2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967) at 562, 
this court said that it will interfere, ". . • if such ordi-
nances are confiscatory, discriminatory, or unreason-
able," and the court in Bradshaw v. Beaver City, supra, 
placed the additional condition that the city's acts can-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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not be ultra vires. Clearly then, this court has said it will 
interfere in appropriate situations and plaintiffs respect-
fully submit that the present case is such a situation. 
I t is necessary in this matter to go beyond the 
simple proposition that a city has the right to impose 
reasonable conditions upon annexation. I t is important' 
here to consider and analyze the condition being im-
posed. The City of Spanish Fork is requiring as a con-
dition to approving the annexation, that plaintiffs must 
give to the city 2 acre feet of Strawberry Valley water 
shares for every acre of land to be annexed. They must 
give such water shares or the money equivalent not only 
for their own property but for the property of other 
dissenting property owners who are also within the ter-
ritory to be annexed. This, by definition, is a classical 
example of a taking of private property rights by a gov-
ernment body. The city is seeking to compel the plain-
tiffs to surrender a constitutional right as an inducement 
to the city to exercise its discretionary power of com-
pleting the annexation. 
Plaintiffs contend that it is elementary constitu-
tional law that the government cannot seek to obtain 
compliance with an unconstitutional demand by making 
that illegal demand a condition upon which government 
will act in any situation wherein discretion is vested in 
government. This fundamental principal is more elo-
quently expressed by the United States Supreme Court 
in Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 
583 at 593. The court there said: 
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"It would be a palpable incongruity to strike 
down an act of state legislation which, by words 
of express divestment seeks to strip the citizen 
of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion, but to uphold an act by which the same 
result is accomplished under the guise of a sur-
render of a right in exchange for a valuable 
privilege which the state threatens otherwise to 
withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the 
proposition that, as a general rule, the state, 
having the power to deny a privilege altogether, 
may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit 
to impose. But the power of the state in that 
respect is not unlimited, (emphasis added) and 
one of the limitations is that it may not impose 
conditions which require the relinquishment of 
constitutional rights. If the state may compel 
the surrender of one constitutional right as a 
condition of its favor, it may in like manner, 
compel a surrender of all. I t is inconceivable 
that guarantees embedded in the constitution of 
the United States may thus be manipulated 
out of existance." 
See also Bynum v. Schiro, D. C. 219 F . Supp. 204, 
Plaintiffs respectfully draw the court's attention 
to The Vagabond Club v. Salt Lake City, 21 U.2d 318, 
445 P.2d 691 (1968). This is an interesting case whose 
constitutional issues closely parallel the constitutional 
issues presently at hand. In that case, the Vagabond 
Club had applied to Salt Lake City for a license to op-
erate as a non profit social club. A city's perrogatives 
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to license or not to license in such situations are very 
similar to a city's perrogatives to annex or not to annex. 
In the Vagabond Club case, Salt Lake City passed Or-
dinance Section 20-29-7 which required, as a condition 
of obtaining such license, that the club be required to 
furnish to the city police an appropriate key or other 
devise that would permit the police to obtain immediate 
entry and access to the club without notice or warrant. 
The city argued eloquently that conditions for licensing 
were perrogatives that belonged solely to the city and 
that this requirement was necessary for the city police 
to use as a tool for law enforcement- At page 696, the 
Utah court struck down both that portion of the city 
statute and the city's argument with these words, 
"In the instant action, the provisions of the 
ordinance which compel the clubs to provide a 
key to the police, permit inspections for viola-
tions of the law and waive the necessity of a 
warrant, proscribe the safeguards of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution of the United States and are 
therefore unconstitutional" (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs here urge that the proscription of the 
Fifth Amendment as is being attempt by the city in the 
instant case now before the court is no less tolerable 
than the proscription of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment as in the Vagabond Club case. 
If the city is allowed the perrogative of requiring 
the plaintiffs to transfer to the city without compensa-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tion valuable water shares, before the city will complete 
annexation, the city will at the same time be given the 
power to completely abrogate the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee that private property cannot be taken for a 
public purpose without just compensation, and in effect, 
such approval to the city could open the way for this 
city and others in similar situations, to effectively do 
away with the Bill of Rights. 
P O I N T I I I . 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F I N D -
I N G T H E CONDITION F O R A N N E X A T I O N 
R E A S O N A B L E . 
The requirement that the plaintiffs transfer to the 
city, "water shares without compensation as a condition 
for annexation is arbitrary and capricious. 
Plaintiffs contend that conditions placed on an-
nexation have traditionally been conditions requiring 
that the territory to be annexed comply with existing 
zoning ordinances, safety ordinances and tax ordinances. 
See for example, the conditions imposed by the city in 
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, supra. In other words, they 
have been conditions related to the city's concern that 
annexed property will, after annexation, be on the same 
status and basis as property already within the cor-
porate limits of the city. 
In the situation presently at hand, Spanish Fork 
is attempting to impose conditions that do not pertain 
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to the status, the condition or the use of the property. 
Nor is the condition aimed at any form of control of the 
property. The condition is not even directed at all prop-
erty owners of the proposed territory for annexation. 
I t is instead aimed at the petitioners for annexation. 
Plaintiffs contend that it is this departure from the con-
cept of placing the condition on the property to the con-
cept of placing condition on some of the property own-
ers within the territory, that leads to the inequality of 
the treatment among the people involved. 
Defendant herein readily admits and does not con-
trovert the fact that if a person or persons subdivide any 
given number of acres of land within the city limits, such 
person or persons will not be required to forfeit water 
shares as these plaintiffs are being so required. Instead, 
the city will purchase water shares from such 'in 
city' subdividers. (R-52)- Obviously, the subdivision of 
property within the city's limits can clearly present the 
same problem to the city, relative to the supply of water 
service to householders, as annexation of property can. 
These plaintiffs then are having a burden placed on them 
that property owners within the city are not experi-
encing. 
In essence, the majority property owners of this 
territory must, by the city's terms, (1) forfeit their own 
water shares, and (2) provide additional water shares 
for the territory's minority property owners. They must 
do this, notwithstanding the fact that the minority prop-
erty owners do not have to forfeit their water shares, nor 
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have any of the other of the city's inhabitants, including 
'in city' subdividers. I t is this inherrent inequality among 
the plaintiffs, the minority property owners within the 
territory to be annexed, and the present inhabitants of 
the city which render this condition so arbitrary, and 
which creates a denial of equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The lower court in the reasoning given for its rul-
ing stated: "The extension of municipal facilities to new 
territory requiring servicing by water, power, sewer, 
roads, etc., would reasonably require that the legislative 
body provide the resources within the project area 
needed to assist in providing the municipal facilities to 
be transferred without compensation to the municipality 
if annexation is allowed." (R- l l ) . Plaintiffs take ex-
ception to such reasoning. 
The lower court has lumped together "resources" 
and "facilities" and spoken generally of ". . . servicing 
by water, power, sewer, roads, etc. . . ."• Roads, sewer 
lines, power lines, and water lines are facilities, and all 
of them can, by state statutory authority, be required 
to be furnished without cost to the city. However, the 
water that goes into the water lines, and the power that 
goes in the power lines are resources. 
Following the reasoning of the lower court, hypo-
thetically a city that has its own electric utility com-
pany (for example Bountiful), could require petition-
ers for annexation, because the "legislative body must 
provide resources within the area" (R- l l ) to provide 
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two shares of Utah Power and Light stock for each acre 
of land being annexed. I t would seem by the court's 
reasoning, that if a city can require, as a condition, two 
acre feet of an irrigation water stock for each acre of 
land annexed, that a city could also require, as a condi-
tion, two shares of Utah Power and Light stock for 
each acre being annexed. I t would appear necessary only 
that it be done with the stated purpose of furnishing re-
sources to the new area. 
The court below, continuing with its reasoning, 
states that if such requirements cannot be imposed then 
it ". . . would make annexation a matter of right by 
simply meeting the statutory requirements . . . " ( R - l l ) . 
Plaintiffs have acknowledged that the city's perroga-
tives in the area of annexation are substantial. How-
ever, the distressing implication of the lower court's 
ruling is that cities, under the guise of protecting the 
city's interests, can operate with little or no limitations 
on those perrogatives- To grant cities such broad dis-
cretionary powers, without state statuatory authority 
for the city's acts would be improper and unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
The state's statutes p r o v i d e ample authority 
for the city of Spanish Fork to acquire water sources 
and to be adequately and properly compensated for such 
acquisitions. The city should be required to act within 
the authority granted by those statutes. To give the 
city the power to require petitioners for annexation to 
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provide water shares or money to the city for and in 
behalf of the dissenting property owners as well as them-
selves is clearly a taking of private property without 
compensation and violates the protection, afforded such 
petitioners, of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 
The city's actions in picking and choosing among 
the persons who must thus finance new water sources 
for the city is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and 
clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F R E D G. B I E S I N G E R 
1600-A Millcreek Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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